SOME ASPECTS OF THE LAW OF LIBEL,
APPLICABLE TO NEWSDEALERS.
The administration of justice is deemed by the laity a very
:simple matter. They by no means conceive the intricacy of
the affairs which courts are called on to unravel nor the
strong equities which often clamor for each of the contending
parties. Said a German farmer to the writer: "The Judges
of the Supreme Court have an easy time. They just sit
there and decide, and I suppose, too, that everything goes by
favor." The speaker was a prominent and well-to-do man in
Jhis town, often its chairman and once a member of the State
Legislature. His sentiment, I take it, is the sentiment of very
:many, perhaps most, rural and unsophisticated persons.
Yet, after all, Lord Chief Justice Russell was right in sayung that: "Justice and its administration are amongst tne
prime needs and business of life." Exact justice is often
impossible, yet the law seeks and, in the main we may believe,
the courts attain far better results than would be reached if
their functions were confided to those humane and upright,
but unlearned persons, who very sharply attack the bench and
,more than intimate that they themselves could do better.
When King James the First sought to take to himself the
-decision of cases pending in his Majesty's Courts he soon felt
the difficulty and expressed it with his usual clumsy misapprehension. " I could get along very well," said the royal
pedant, "hearing one side only, but when both sides have
been heard, by my soul, I know not which is right."
Libel is by no means a rare action in this country, as a
glance at the American Digest will show. Thus, in 1893, we
find there digested 187 points in the law of libel, 23 of them
in criminal cases. In 1894, 181 points, 13 of them in criminal cases. In I895,, 193 points, 21 in criminal cases. In
z896, 236 points, 20 in criminal cases.
Now the rules of liability to which persons are held in
libel are often of the less simple and palpable character. It
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is always hard to believe that persons morally innocent can?
be legally condemned.
That those who committed no.
crime and intended no crime and have been personally knowing of no crime can yet be successfully charged with responsibility for it.
The liability of a newsdealer from whose shop a libelous:
publication is sold without his procurement or knowledgesometimes presents a case where the scales seem closely bal-anced. The libel is quite as injurious to the wronged person.
as any other. It seems he ought not to be remediless. Yet
the newsdealer himself has wittingly offended in no way, and
is, perhaps, guilty of no moral crime. Though actions forlibel are not uncommon with us, English courts and juries
seem to so greatly favor large recoveries in cases of this sort,
often upon comparatively slight showing, that this form ofaction seems particularly prevalent in the British Isles. We
must look, therefore, to English Reports for fuller and more
varied consideration of the various liabilities arising underthis head. There we find this liability of the newsdealer
much considered.
Thus, in Dominus Rex v. Elizabeth Nutt, Fitzgibbon, 47,.
(same case, I Barnardiston, K. B. 3o6,) information for publishing a treasonable libel was tried at fhe Guildhall before
Raymond, Chief Justice, -where, upon the evidence it appeared.
that the defendant kept a pamphlet shop and that this libel
was sold in the same shop by the defendant's servant for thedefendant's use and account, in her absence and that she did'
not know the contents cf it, nor of its coming in or going
out; et per Raymond, Chief Justice: "Notwithstanding, the
defendant is guilty of publishing -this libel, the shop being kept
under her authority and direction ; and 'twould be of very
dangerous consequence that the law were otherwise; and it
has been so ruled in a great many'instances." Mr. Kettleby,
in -Barnardiston's Report, is reported as urging, "indeed, theact of a servant may charge a mistress in a civil suit, yet it
was by no means reasonable it should charge her in a criminal prosecution;"' and in Fitzgibbon, " If a.post-boy should.
carry a libel sealed up, into the tcountry, must he -be punished.
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'for it?" To which Raymond, Chief Justice, answered, " That
there the question would be, whether such carrying by a postboy Would be deemed in law a publication; and in all these
cases the mischief is equal, though the parties' intention do not
-concur." In Banardiston's Report the Chief Justice is reported
-as answering that the case of the post-boy was not at present
in question. "But he observed that if a servant carries a
libel for his master, he certainly is answerable for what he
-does, though he cannot so much as write or read." The
jury being unwilling to agree upon a verdict, the AttorneyGeneral consented a juror should be withdrawn, which was
-accordingly done.
In King v. Dodd, 2 Sessions Cases, 33, (Hilary, io Geo.
K. B.,) an information was moved for against the defendant
-for selling and publishing a libel against one Chambers, and
it was insisted on for the defendant that she was sick and that
her servant took the libel into her shop without her knowledge. But, by the Court: "this'is no excuse, for a master
shall answer for his servant, and the law presumes him to be
acquainted with what his servant does. Mr. Justice Fortescue
said that it had been ruled that the finding of a libel on a
bookseller's shelf was a publication of it by the bookseller.
And Lord Chief Justice Raymond said that it hath been held
that where a master liveth out of town, and his trade is carried on by his servant, the master shall be chargeable with the
servant's publishing a libel in his absence."
In 1770, was decided the famous case of Rex v. AlMn, 5
1Burrows, 2686. In this case the defendant had been con-victed of publishing a libel, (Junius' Letters,) in a copy of a
magazine called the "London Museum," which was bought at
his shop and even professed to be "printed for him." His
counsel moved, on Tuesday, the 19 th of June, 1770, for a new
trial, upon the foot of the evidence being insufficient to prove
any criminal intention in Mr. Almon, or even the least knowl.edge of these magazines being sold at his shop. And they had
affidavits to prove that it was a frequent practice in the trade
for one publisher to put another publisher's name to a
pamphlet, and that this was the present case, and this

SOME ASPECTS OF THE LAW

OF LIBEL,

was without defendant's knowledge or approbation. That, as;
soon as he saw his name put to the publication in question,
he sent a note expressing his disapprobation to the real publisher. That he himself had no concern whatever in the
London Museum." That he was not at home when they weresent to his shop. That the whole number sent to his shop was:
three hundred. That about sixty-seven of them had been sold'
there by a boy in his shop, but without Mr. Almon's ownr
knowledge, privity, or approbation. That as soon as he discovered it he stopped the sale, ordered the remainder to becarried up into his garret, and took the first oppurtunity toreturn them to Mr. Miller. That it was not proved that the
person who sold them was Mr. Almon's servant or employed
by him, or that Mr. Almon was at all privy to the sale.
Sergeant Glynn stoutly argued that the proof against Mr.
Almon appeared therefore to be defective: there was nothing7
to constitute criminality or induce punishment. He further
offered the affidavit of one of the jury that he, the juror,
understood Lord Mansfield to say that bare proof of the sale
in. Mr. Almon's shop without any proof of privity, knowledge, etc., was conclusive evidence, and that if he had understood the jury were at liberty to exercise their own judgment,.
he would have acquitted the defendant. The Court very peremptorily refused to allow the affidavit to be read, but Lord
Mansfield said he had been properly understood. That the
substance of what he had said was "that in point of law the
buying of the pamphlet in the public open shop of a known, professed, bookseller and publisher of pamphlets, of a persorn
acting in the shop, primafade, is evidence of a publication by
the master himself; but that it is liable to be contradicted,
where the fact will bear it, by contrary evidence tending to
exculpate the master and to show that he was not privy nor
assenting to it nor encouraging it. That this being primafacie
evidence of a publication by the master himself, it stands good
till answered by him, and if not answered at all it therebybecomes conclusive so far as to be sufficient to convict him.
In practice, in experience, in -history, in the memory of alP
persons living, this is, I believe, the first time it was, ever
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doubted that this is good evidence against a bookseller or
publisher of pamphlets. The constant practice is to read the
libel as soon as ever it has been proved to be bought at the
defendant's shop. This practice shows that it is considered
already proved upon the defendant; for it could not be
read against him before it had been proved upon him." He
declared this as much established, as that the eldest son is
heir to his. father, and all the judges warmly concurred.
The King v. Woodfall, Lofts, 776, was the yet more celebrated case in which the principal publishers of Junius Letters
were prosecuted in 1774 for a libel on the revolution and on
the persons of King William and Queen Mary. Counsel for
defendant said, in closing, "What is there to fix it on the
defendant, who was in prison and ignorant of the publication ? "
Lord Mansfield, "Whenever a man publishes he publishes at
his peril, for there is no entering into the secret thoughts of a
man's heart. If he had been in close custody so that his servant could have no access there, I should have thought it a
difference very proper to have been left to you; but it is just
the same as in his own house; for his servants and all the
world had access; and the boy brought the paper to him
every day. Otherwise I should have thought the particular
circumstances very proper to have taken it out of the general
case; but here it is just as in the case of last Saturday. He
either did or did not know it; if he did then he is answerable
upon that case, if not he ought to have known it." The defendants were both found guilty and each was fined 300 marks.
Passing down from these classical days of the law, when the
silver-tongued Murray was devoting his great talents to nobly
and reasonably expanding the law merchant, but to ignobly
and unreasonably contracting the ideas of human liberty, or,
at least, to combating their development in many other lines,
we find an interesting civil case in which a great judge, Lord
Esher, Master of the Rolls, happily still living at a venerable
age and administering his historic office, illuminates the subject.
The case is Emmens v. Pottle, 16 L. R. Q. B. Div. 354
(1885-6). This was an action for 5ooo pounds damages
against defendants, who were news vendors, for publishing a
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libel against plaintiff by selling a copy of the newspaper known
as " Money," containing the defamatory matter complained of.
Defendants set up that they were news vendors, carrying on a
large business in London, and as such sold the copy of the
periodical in the ordinary course of business, without any
knowledge of its contents. The jury found that neither of the
defendants knew when they sold the newspaper that it contained any libel, that they were not negligent in so failing to
know, and that the newspaper was not of a character likely to
contain libelous matter. The plaintiff in person argued his
case, and on his saying, " If a man deals in dangerous articles
he ought to be liable for an injury which is caused by them,"
he was interrupted by a question from Bowen, L. J., "Are
you not bound to show that a newspaper is in its nature a
dangerous thing?" In the principal opinion, Lord Esher,
M. R., observed, "I agree that the defendants are primafacie
liable. They have handed to other people a newspaper in
which there is a libel on the plaintiff. I am inclined to think
that this called upon the defendants to shew some circumstances which absolve them from liability, not by way of
privilege, but facts which shew that they did not publish the
libel. We must consider what the position of the defendants
was. The proprietor of a newspaper who, publishes the newspaper by his servants, is the publisher of it, and he is liable for
the acts of his servants. The printer of the paper prints it by
his servants and therefore he is liable for a libel contained in
it. But the defendants did not compose the libel on the
plaintiff, they did not write or print it, they only disseminated
that which contained the libel. The question is whether, as
such disseminators, they published the libel. If they had
known what was in the paper, whether they were paid for
circulating it or not, they would have published the libel and
would have been liable for so doing. That, I think, cannot
be doubted. But here upon the findings of the jury we must
take it that the defendant did not know that the paper
contained a libel. I am not prepared to say that it would be
sufficient for them to shew that they did not know of the
particular libel; but the findings of the jury make it clear that
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the defendants did not publish the libel. Taking the view of
the jury to be right, that the defendants did not know that the
paper was likely to contain a libel, and, still more, that they
ought not to have known this, which must mean, that they
ought not to have known it, having used reasonable care-the
case is reduced to this, that the defendants were innocent
disseminators of a thing which they were not bound to know
was likely to contain a libel. If they were liable the result
would be that every common carrier who carries a newspaper which contains a libel would be liable for it, even if the
paper was one of which every man in England would say that
it was not likely to contain a libel. To my mind the mere
statement of such a result shews that the proposition from
which it flows is unreasonable and unjust. The question does
not depend on any statute but on the common law, and in my
opinion, any proposition, the result of which would be to shew
that the common law of England is wholly unreasonable and
unjust, cannot be part of the common law of England."
Bowen, L. J., said further, "The jury have found as a fact
that the defendants were innocent carriers of that which they
did not know contained libelous matter and which they had no
reason to suppose was likely to contain libelous matter. A
newspaper is not like a fire; a man can carry it about without
being bound to suppose that it is likely to do any injury. It
seems to me that the defendants are no more liable than
any other innocent carrier of an article which he has no
reason to suppose likely to be dangerous. But I by no means
intend to say that the vender of a newspaper will not be
responsible for a libel contained in it if he knows or ought to
know that the paper is one which is likely to contain a lible."
Plaintiff's appeal dismissed.
In Regina v. Judd, 37 Weekly R. 143, (I888), the High
Court held that where the "St. Stephen's Review" was
printed by a limited corporation for the proprietors of the
Review and the latter published it, under the rule of Emmens
v. Pottle (supra) the directors of the printing company who
'knew nothing of the contents of the Review were liable
neither criminally nor civilly.
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In line with the suggestion of the last cases it has been held,
limiting some earlier dicta, that if a porter in course of business delivers parcels containing libelous hand-bills he is not
liable for libel, if shown to be ignorant of the contents of the
parcel, for he is but doing his duty in the ordinary way: Day
v. Bream, 2 Moody & Rob. 54.
The case of Street v.Johnson, 8o Wis. 455, decided in 1891,
briefly reviews the earlier cases in deciding on the liability of
a defendant sued for a libel upon the members of the W. C.
T. U., contained in " The Sunday Sun," sold by him at his
news stand. The learned Chief Justice, speaking for the
court, says: "The authorities are to the effect that the mere
seller of newspapers is not liable for selling and delivering a
newspaper containing a libel upon the plaintiff if he can prove
upon the trial, to the satisfaction of the jury, that he did not
know that the paper contained a libel, that his ignorance was
not due to any negligence on his part, and that he did not
know and had no ground for supposing that the paper was
likely to contain libelous matter." Citing various English and
American cases, and continuing, " But it seems to be equally
well settled that such sale and delivery of a newspaper containing a libel is,primafacie, the publication of such libel, and
hence makes such vendor, primafacie, liable therefor." As
it is summed up by Mr. Townsend in his excellent work on
Slander and Libel (4th edition), section 124, "The proprietor
,of a bookstore or newspaper store is responsible for the contents of every book and paper sold in his store, unless he
can prove that he did not know and had no reason to
suppose that the book or paper contained any defamatory
-natter."
Of course, in general, the doctrine "quifacitper aliumfacit
per se" applies to the liability for libel by the agent or associate of the accused: Newell on Def. Slander and Libel, page
228, citing Flood on Libel and Slander, page 43.
But as a part of this rule the liability of the dealer for the
publication of a libel by his agent evidently depends upon such
publication being in the course of the business or employment
.authorized.
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So it has been held that one partner, in the business of selling
-furniture and draperies, was not liable for a libelous placard
placed, without his knowledge or consent, by his co-partners
upon a table in front of their shop, which read as follows:
"Taken back from Dr. W., who could not pay for it, to be
'sold at a bargain; " and on a separate card, " Moral: Beware
of dead-beats." The court says, "There is nothing in the
nature of the business of this firm . . . from which authority
-to one partner or to a servant to gratuitously publish a libel
can be implied. The case is different from that of a partnership whose business is publishing or selling either books or
newspapers, where each partner is supposed to have authority
to publish or sell, and to determine what shall be published
or sold, and also from that of the necessary correspondence of
a firm where each partner is presumed authorized to conduct
-it and to determine on its substance and terms." See Woodling v. Knickerbocker, (Minn.) 17 N. W. 387.
From this brief collocation of cases and authorities we may
conclude that a newsdealer is not liable under our own or
English law for the sale in his shop, even by his own hand, of
a libelous publication if he did not know it to be such, had no
occasion to suspect that it contained libelous matter, and was
guilty of no negligence in not discovering its character. But
that, since the partner or servant of a newsdealer is authorized
to give out for him whatever is in the line of goods dealt in,
that the absent partner or master is liable for the act of the
representative or servant in the course of the business, as if
the act were his own. That, under the general doctrines
applicable to principal and agent, neither newsdealer nor other
dealer is liable for unauthorized acts of partner or servant
done without his knowledge and outside of the scope of the
partnership or agency; but that as to all sales of publications
-coming within a news vendor's business, he is liable, if made
in his shop in his absence, in the same manner as if he were
present.
It seems, thus, that an innocent person may be guilty of
libel through the act of one for whom he is responsible. That
this hardship upon the innocent culprit is logical and necessary
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to protect the equally innocent and otherwise defenseless injured
person from that blighting crime of defamation
"Whose edge is sharper than the sword, whose tongue
"Outvenoms all the worms of Nile, whose breath
"R ides on the posting winds, and doth belie
"All corners of the world."
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College of Law,
University of Wisconsin.

